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Lessons for Public Pensions  
from Utah’s Move to Pension Choice 
 
Robert L. Clark, Emma Hanson, and Olivia S. Mitchell 
 
 
The financial crisis of 2008-09 took a major toll on U.S. public pension plan investments, 
and the ensuing Great Recession deepened the challenges facing these plans. As a consequence, 
many public employers were forced to restructure their retirement schemes, and a recent survey 
found that since 2011, almost all states changed public pension benefit and contribution formulas 
to rein in costs (NASRA, 2014a). Moreover, several states have taken a further step, significantly 
modifying their plan designs so as to transfer risk away from plan sponsors and onto employees. 
In particular, several states have offered employees the option to choose which retirement plan 
they want, with options including defined benefit, defined contribution, or hybrid plans. 
This paper explores the restructuring of Utah’s statewide public employee pension system 
in 2011, in response to the financial challenges described above. Previously, the Utah Retirement 
System (URS) provided public employees with a traditional defined benefit (DB) plan. Before the 
2008-09 financial downturn, Utah’s pension system was one of the most well-funded statewide 
pension plans in the country, with an average funded ratio of 95 percent. With the downturn, 
however, investments losses led to in a substantial decline in URS’s funded ratio which had 
dropped to 83 percent by 2010. 1  Consequently, the system’s actuaries forecasted that large 
increases in annual required contributions would be needed to cover the losses. To avoid imposing 
                                                        
1 URS’s funded ratio as of January 1, 2013 was 77.1%.  This includes the recognition of the final 20% of the 2008 
investment loss. 
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additional financial strain on taxpayers, the Utah legislature responded by making major changes 
to pension offerings provided to new employees.2 The legislator sponsoring the reform, Dan 
Liljenquist, explained that, “our goals with reform were two-fold: one, to make sure that we could 
meet every penny of the commitment that we had already made to current employees and retirees, 
and two, to reduce and eventually eliminate the pension-related bankruptcy risk to the state.” 
(McGuinn 2015, P 9).3  
Legislation authorizing the pension reform went into effect in 2011, officially closing the 
defined benefit (DB) plans to new employees and establishing the new two-option retirement 
plan that would replace it.  The two new retirement plan options were expected to be less 
generous than the former DB plans and could, therefore, be anticipated to reduce the state’s 
future pension liabilities. Post-reform, new hires could choose one of two new options: a defined 
contribution (DC) plan, or a hybrid pension plan that incorporated both DB and DC elements 
(about which we say more below). New hires who failed to make an active choice between plans 
were automatically enrolled in the hybrid plan.  
Using administrative data provided by URS, we examine how new hires’ plan choices 
differed according to individual and job characteristics. Additionally, we evaluate how the 
pension reform changed two employee behaviors: contributions to supplemental plans, and 
turnover patterns. Prior literature has not examined these behavioral responses to such public 
pension changes, focusing mainly on how funding responded to changes in contributions and 
benefits.4  By contrast, our analysis provides evidence from Utah suggesting that it is important 
                                                        
2 Due to legal constraints, benefits could not be reduced for existing employees. 
3 A simulation analysis by Evans and Phillips (2014) estimated that the pre-reform Utah retirement system had a 50 
percent chance of exhausting its pension fund by 2028. 
4  Plan sponsors generally are aware of the balancing act between two competing goals of providing adequate 
retirement income to members and ensuring the long-term financial stability of the plan. In the 2013 Summary Report 
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not to neglect the effects of retirement plan restructuring on public employee behavior.  Indeed, 
such outcomes could undermine state governments’ ability to deliver services promised to their 
citizens.  
We summarize our findings in Figure 1. First, most new hires failed to make an active 
choice between the available pension plan options, so defaults mattered.  Second, one might 
have anticipated that the less generous retirement plan would have encouraged new hires to save 
more through supplemental plans, but this did not occur. Interestingly, those who did make an 
active plan choice for the primary account were also likely to participate in supplemental 
retirement plans. Third, post-reform, public employee turnover rates rose.  
Figure 1 here 
In what follows, we begin by reviewing key aspects of Utah’s traditional DB plan and 
compare it to the two new plans adopted in 2011. Using administrative records provided by URS, 
we then estimate models of plan choice to evaluate who elected which plan and who defaulted. 
Inasmuch as both of the new plans are likely to pay less generous retirement benefits than the prior 
DB pension, we also inquire whether new hires saved more voluntarily, so as to bolster retirement 
incomes.  We also compare turnover rates for both pre- and post-reform new hires, to assess the 
impact of retirement plan type on employee retention rates. In a final section, we draw lessons 
from the Utah reform relevant to other states and municipalities looking to restructure their pension 
offerings. 
 
 
                                                        
to Members, Daniel Andersen, the executive director of URS wrote: “while conditions for retirement benefits have 
changed over the past few years, our primary purpose was to provide retirement security and professional service to 
members and retirees.”  (see http://www.urs.org/mango/pdf/urs/SummaryReport/2013/summaryReport.pdf.) 
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Relevant Prior Studies  
While we lack the space to review what has grown to be a very large literature on pensions, 
we call attention here to a few recent accounts on how public pensions have sought to deal with 
pressing fiscal challenges. Media reports by Walsh (2011), Lyman and Walsh (2014), and 
Greenhouse (2011), among others, have reported on how public pension benefit and contribution 
parameters were changed in the wake of the financial and economic crisis. In the academic 
literature, Chingos and West (2013), Lachance, Mitchell, and Smetters (2003), and Milevsky, 
Promislow, and David (2004) have examined specific state pension changes and their impacts.5  
More recently, Novy-Marx and Rauh (2015) have shown how linking public pension payouts to 
investment performance might help alleviate the critical funding shortfalls many states now face. 
Particularly pertinent to the present paper is prior research on how pension reforms alter 
employee behavior. To date, however, most empirical studies have focused on private-sector firms 
and employees, as shown in two reviews by Gustman and Mitchell (1992), and Gustman, Mitchell, 
and Steinmeier (1994). Case studies of corporate plan conversions are discussed by Clark and 
Munzenmaier (2001). In point of fact, relatively few private sector firms give employees the 
opportunity to choose among alternative types of pension plans.6 For this reason, prior studies have 
mainly focused on worker turnover patterns, generating two main findings. First, employees of 
firms offering pension plans tend to separate less frequently than employees at other firms (Allen, 
Clark, and McDermed, 1993). Whether this is causal or simply correlational has been difficult to 
confirm, due to a lack of identifying restrictions. Second, there appear to be no major differences 
in turnover rates between employees offered DB versus DC plans. This is contrary to what might 
                                                        
5 For useful historical treatments of US public pensions, see Clark, Craig, and Anhmed (2009), and Clark, Craig, and 
Wilson (2003). Mitchell (2012) and Pew Center on the States (2010a,b) review the financial challenges confronting 
modern-day public plans. 
6 Some non-profit firms do, including the firm examined by Mitchell, Utkus, and Yang (2007). 
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be expected, since DB plans have traditionally been more “back-loaded,” meaning that employees 
with long tenures typically receive more valuable retirement benefits than employees with shorter 
tenures. By contrast, hybrid and DC plans provide benefits in a more balanced manner, rewarding 
employees with both long and short employment tenures more equitably. Moreover, retirement 
wealth accumulated in DC plans is more portable than that accumulated in a traditional DB plan, 
meaning that DC plans provide much greater value than DB plans for short-term workers who may 
wish to move to a new employer prior to retirement. 
In the public sector, it is somewhat more common that participants are allowed a choice 
between two or more pension plans, especially at public universities. NASRA (2010) showed that 
nearly half of state universities offered faculty choice between a DB and a DC plan. Clark and 
Hanson (2011) reported that five statewide retirement systems covering general public employees 
or teachers offered a DB/DC choice, two offered a choice between a DB and a hybrid, and one 
offered a choice between all three plans types. According to Munnell, Aubry, and Cafarelli (2014), 
states that started offering optional DC plans before the financial crisis did so because these gave 
workers the opportunity to manage their own money, particularly given the rising equity market. 
Post-financial crisis, Utah has been the only statewide system to launch a new reform providing 
choice between two plan types; nevertheless, five other states have joined Utah in offering a hybrid 
plan. 
In the last two decades, many researchers have studied the impact of public sector plan 
choices on aspects of employee behavior. For instance, Clark, Ghent, and McDermed (2006) 
studied public university faculty members’ pension plan choices in North Carolina.7 As expected, 
                                                        
7 Also see Clark and Pitts’ (1999) examination of faculty members’ pension plan choice patterns at North Carolina 
State University. 
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they found that older individuals were more likely to select the DB option, whereas younger and, 
potentially, more mobile workers were more likely to select the DC plan. In their study of Oregon’s 
Public Employees Retirement System, Chalmers, Johnston, and Reuter (2008) evaluated how 
different plan types influenced the retirement patterns of older individuals, concluding that a 
substantial minority of employees did not adequately understand the plans’ complex incentives. 
Goldhaber and Grout (2013) studied the pension plan preferences of public school teachers in 
Washington State and the found that, with the exception of age, observable teacher and job 
characteristics were not significant predictors of the plan choice decision among new hires.  Brown 
and Weisbenner (2014) examined DB versus DC plan choice for employees of the Illinois State 
University system, using an administrative data set linked to a participant survey on plan and 
worker attributes. They concluded that those preferring the DC plan were predominately men; they 
also tended to be less risk averse and more financially literate than employees electing other plan 
options. Thus, while prior studies have provided insight into the types of workers electing different 
types of retirement plans when given a choice, they are not informative with regard to how workers 
electing different retirement plan types respond along behavioral or other dimensions. Accordingly, 
in what follows, we will investigate the determinants of plan choice by public sector employees in 
Utah, along with associations between plan choice and measures of two important behavioral 
outcomes: post-reform contributions to supplemental plans, and post-reform employment turnover 
rates.  
 
Public Retirement Plans in Utah 
Utah’s public employee pension plans date to the first half of the 20th century, beginning 
with retirement plans introduced for school teachers and firefighters. A statewide teachers’ 
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retirement system was established in 1937, followed by the adoption of a plan for state officers 
and employees in 1947.  After a series of modifications, pension plans were consolidated into the 
Utah Retirement Systems in 1963.8  Today, URS provides retirement benefits for more than 450 
public employers including the State of Utah, local governments, school districts, and some 
employees in higher educational institutions.  (Faculty and other exempt higher education 
employees are not members of URS.)  Most public employees in Utah are also covered by Social 
Security.9   
In this section, we describe the various retirement plans offered to public employees in 
Utah.  First, we discuss the pre-reform defined benefit plan that covered full time employees prior 
to 2011.  Next, we review the post-reform hybrid and defined contribution plans offered to new 
hires following these reforms and compare the generosity of the pre and post-reform pension plans.  
Finally, we describe URS supplemental retirement savings plans available to employees both pre 
and post-reform. 
 
The Traditional Defined Benefit Plan (Tier I) Employees hired prior to July 1, 2011 were 
automatically enrolled into URS Tier I System, a traditional DB plan.  The Tier I Retirement 
System was composed of six different plans: a Public Employees’ Contributory Retirement Plan, 
a Noncontributory Retirement System, a Public Safety Retirement System, a Firefighters’ System, 
a Governors’ and Legislators’ Retirement Plan, and a Judges’ Retirement System.10  
                                                        
8  A brief history of the development of public sector retirement plans in Utah is available at 
https://www.urs.org/mango/pdf/urs/Miscellaneous/miniHistory.pdf 
9 A brief overview of the plans currently offered to Utah public employees appears in Appendix Table 1. 
10  The 2013 Actuarial Valuation Report for the Utah Retirement Systems is available at 
https://www.urs.org/mango/pdf/urs/Miscellaneous/ActuarialValuationReport2013.pdf 
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More than 85% of Tier I members belonged to the Public Employees’ Noncontributory 
Retirement System,11 where the employer covered the entire cost of the benefits. At retirement, a 
worker’s benefit amount under this DB plan was derived by calculating two percent of his average 
monthly earnings from his three highest years of earnings, multiplied by his years of service. Thus, 
a 30-year career worker would have earned a lifetime income stream equal to 60 percent of his 
highest three years of earnings. Benefits after retirement were indexed by up to a 4% annual cost 
of living adjustment (NASRA 2014b). Retirement ages were defined by a combination of age and 
service: normal retirement benefits were payable at age 65 with 4 years of service, or 30 years of 
service at any age.  Early retirees could begin benefits at age 60 with 20 years of service, age 62 
with 10 years of service, or at any age with 25 years of service; the early retirement payments were 
reduced by seven percent per year under age 60, and three percent per year from 60 to 65. Retirees 
could choose from six annuity options as well as a partial lump-sum option. 
 
The New Plan Options (Tier II).  Employees hired after July 1, 2011, must choose between a 
DC plan and a hybrid plan; their election would need to be declared prior to the end of their first 
year of employment, and this choice is final and irrevocable. Employees failing to elect a plan 
prior to the end of their first year are automatically enrolled into the default, which is the hybrid 
plan.  
URS communication materials provided to all new hires seek to present a balanced 
assessment of the two plan options, stating that “both plans have advantages and disadvantages.  
The plan that’s better for you will depend on your situation.”  The web page then outlines various 
                                                        
11  The basic structure of this retirement plan is described in Tier 1 Noncontributory, 
https://www.urs.org/mango/pdf/urs/RetirementSystems/noncontrib.pdf 
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aspects of each plan in detail and directs new employees to additional resources, including a 
“decision guide” and several online pension benefit estimate calculators.   
An employee electing the DC plan receives an annual employer contribution of 10 percent 
of his annual earnings into the 401(k) account,12 and these employer contributions vest after four 
years of eligible employment.  Employees may also make additional contributions to their accounts 
on a voluntary basis. Distributions are allowed after retirement, termination of employment, or age 
59 ½, and the funds may be withdrawn various ways, at the retiree’s discretion. No cost of living 
adjustments are provided to DC participants.13 
The hybrid plan differs from the old DB plan in several ways. First, the retirement benefit 
is determined by multiplying the employee’s years of service by 1.5 percent, times the monthly 
average of his highest-five earnings years. Compared to the old DB plan, the longer earnings 
averaging period is likely to lower the benefit. Second, the hybrid plan also requires participants 
to work for 35 years to qualify for a normal retirement benefit at any age, five years longer than 
under the old DB plan; participants may also take an unreduced retirement benefit at age 65 with 
four years of service. Retirees can take a reduced benefit beginning at age 62 with 10 years of 
service, or age 60 with 20 years of service; early retirement reduces benefits by about seven percent 
per year between age 60-63, and approximately nine percent per year for age 64-65. Third, the 
hybrid plan permits up to a 2.5 percent cost of living benefit adjustment each year, depending on 
the change in the Consumer Price Index. Retirees have the option of receiving their maximum 
retirement benefits based on the formula, or they can select from several joint and survivorship 
                                                        
12 Similar to other state plans, the URS Public Safety and Firefighters’ plans are somewhat more generous, with a  
state contribution of 12 percent of salary, compared to general state employee plans.   
13 For an overview of cost of living increases in benefits in public pension plans, see NASRA (2014b). 
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options. Individuals may also make voluntary contributions into several retirement saving plans 
described below.  
The hybrid also has another key feature differentiating it from the old model. Every year, 
the plan’s Board of Trustees must set a certified contribution rate for the defined benefit portion 
of the hybrid plan based on the preceding year’s actuarial valuation. As long as the employer 
certified rate remains below 10 percent of compensation, employees are not required to make any 
additional plan contributions. If the rate exceeds 10 percent, participants in the hybrid plan must 
contribute any amount in excess of 10 percent of pay. Conversely, if the employer’s certified 
contribution rate to the DB component were to fall below 10 percent, the employer then must 
contribute the difference between 10 percent of compensation and the certified rate into the 
participant’s 401(k) plan.  For example, in 2014-15, the employer’s certified contribution rate was 
8.22 percent of payroll; therefore, the employer contributed 1.78 percent of payroll into 
employees’ 401(k) accounts that year.14 Pension and employer contributions to the 401(k) account 
are vested after four years of service. 
 
Comparing the Tier I and Tier II Systems.  Generally speaking, the new Tier II arrangement is 
anticipated to pay lower benefits, as compared to the old Tier I DB plan. We illustrate the expected 
difference in retirement benefits assuming the relevant benefit formulas and various age/service 
thresholds for an unreduced benefit. Depending on the plan type (DB versus hybrid) and years of 
service, the outcomes may be compared as follows:  
 
 
                                                        
14 The total employer contribution rate for both the DC plan and the hybrid plan includes an amount for amortization 
of the unfunded actuarial accrued liability in the Tier 1 System.  This amount differs by employer group.  For the fiscal 
year ending June 30, 2015, the Tier II unfunded liability rates for the Tier II Public Employees System ranged from 
6.61% to 9.37%. 
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 Plan Type 
Years of 
Service 
Tier I DB Tier II Hybrid 
10  
20% × average of highest 
3 years earnings 
15% × average of highest 
5 years earnings 
20  
 
40% × average of highest 
3 years earnings 
30% × average of highest 
5 years earnings 
30  
 
60% × average of highest 
3 years earnings 
45% × average of highest 
5 years earnings 
 
The hybrid plan also requires more years of service for normal retirement benefits at any age, 35 
years compared to the 30 years for the Tier I benefit, and the early retirement reductions are larger 
in the hybrid plan. In addition, prior to 2011, state and education employees who were in the Tier 
I DB plan received a 1.5 percent employer contribution to the 401(k) plan.   In other words, the 
generosity of the Tier II model is likely substantially below that of the old Tier I scheme. 
It must be acknowledged that participants in the new Tier II DC and hybrid might 
conceivably generate higher retirement benefits, if their DC returns proved to be much in excess 
of what the old DB would have paid. 15 Nevertheless, this seems unlikely, and the new structure 
clearly shifts risk from the employer to the employees. Evidently, the DC plan participants bear 
all investment risk directly. The hybrid option also poses risk to participants for two reasons. First, 
if the cost of the DB portion of the plan exceeds 10 percent of payroll, workers must contribute 
more to cover the excess cost.16  Second, employees also bear the potential cost of mismatched 
                                                        
15 Assuming that DC plan investments earn 6.5 percent compounded steadily for 30 years and the balance is annuitized 
for 25 years, NASRA (2014c) suggests that the payouts could be higher from Utah’s hybrid plan than the traditional 
DB. This computation did not consider investment risk, longevity risk, or the 1.5% employer 401(k) contribution 
provided to state and education employees before the reform. 
16 There is also an interesting generational cross-subsidy element in the new plan, in that workers but not retirees will 
be required to cover excess costs over 10 percent of pay. In the event that longevity rose or investment earnings fell 
more than expected, active employees would be required to subsidize retirees. Whether participants understand this 
generational redistribution feature is unclear. 
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assets and liabilities in the hybrid plan, while not having any control over that plan’s asset mix. It 
is unclear whether this potential moral hazard on the part of the plan’s investment managers is 
widely appreciated.17 
 
Supplemental Plans. Public employees also have the option of contributing to several 
supplemental retirement saving plans. Currently URS offers a 401(k) plan, a 457 plan, and a 
traditional as well as a Roth IRA. All URS members are eligible to participate in the IRA. With 
the introduction of Tier II, all employers are required to participate in the 401(k) plan and many 
also participate in the 457 plan. State agencies offer no any employer match to employee 
contributions for general state employees. 18  These supplemental plans provide eight core 
investment options along with target date funds.  In addition, a self-directed brokerage account for 
pre-tax contributions is available through a private money manager.19 All employee contributions 
are immediately vested and thus may be cashed out when employment is terminated.  
 
Multivariate Determinants of Public Plan Choice 
New hires in the Tier II system must choose between enrolling in the hybrid plan or in the 
DC plan within one year after their initial employment. As noted above, employees who fail to 
make an active choice of primary plan option are automatically enrolled into the default hybrid 
plan.  
                                                        
17 For arguments against holding stock in DB plans, see for instance Bader and Gold (2007) and Black (1989).   
18 Participants in the Tier 1 Public Employees Noncontributory Retirement System still receive an additional employer 
contribution of 1.5% of their compensation in the 401(k) plan.  All other employers also have the option of contributing 
to URS 401(k) and/or 457 Plans on behalf of their employees. 
19  A description of these plans and their investment options can be found at 
https://www.urs.org/mango/pdf/urs/InvestmentOptions/2015/investmentOptions.pdf, 
https://www.urs.org/mango/pdf/urs/Savings/401kSummary.pdf, 
https://www.urs.org/mango/pdf/urs/Savings/457Summary.pdf 
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To examine who defaulted, and who chose which plan conditional on making an active 
choice, we examine URS administrative records on all individuals who first entered employment 
with a URS-covered employer between January 1, 2006 and September 30, 2013. These records 
include information on employee age, sex, employment dates, and retirement plan choice, along 
with annual earnings, employee contributions to voluntary URS-administered retirement savings 
plans, service credit, and job classification for the period from January 1, 2006 to October 31, 
2014. Because plan choice decisions in the Tier II system do not become final and irrevocable 
until the end of the first year of employment, we restrict our attention to employees who did not 
separate from service in their first year on the job. The resulting sample includes a “pre-reform” 
group of 39,154 employees hired before July 1, 2011, and a “post-reform” group of 16,263 
individuals hired on or after July 1, 2011. 20  Members of the Governors’ and Legislators’ 
Retirement Plan, and the Judges’ Retirement System, are excluded from our analysis.   
Table 1 reports the plan choices of individuals hired post-reform. Almost 60 percent of 
Utah’s new hires failed to make an active choice between the two plan options and were therefore 
defaulted into the hybrid plan, consistent with findings from other states that have offered workers 
a choice of primary retirement plans.21  One explanation for why so many people may have 
defaulted is suggested by the literature on behavioral inertia (Madrian and Shea 2001; Choi et al. 
2004; Yang 2005). Another explanation might be that employees actually preferred the hybrid plan 
over the DC option. This suggests that workers actually preferred the hybrid plan, and simply 
avoided the transaction cost of making an active choice producing the same outcome as doing 
nothing. In Washington State, where public sector workers were given a choice between a 
                                                        
20 Appendix Table 2 provides details on the data construction and how specific variables are defined. 
21In states that offer their workers choice of DB or DC plans, Olleman (2009) reports that 39 percent of Colorado new 
hires are defaulted into the DB plan, 55 percent in Florida, 82 percent of Ohio PERS and 72 percent of Ohio teachers.  
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traditional DB versus a hybrid plan, Olleman (2009) found that close to 70 percent of employees 
rejected the hybrid plan default, actively opting for the traditional DB plan.  As the traditional DB 
plan was no longer an option in Utah, it seems likely that some URS participants defaulted to the 
hybrid plan because they favored it, while others’ choice was likely to have been due to inertia. 
Table 1 here 
Of the approximately 40 percent of URS new hires who actively elected a retirement plan, 
slightly over half selected the hybrid plan, and slightly fewer (48 percent) chose the DC. We also 
see that over time, the proportion of individuals actively selecting the hybrid plan increased, and 
the ratio of people defaulting shrank somewhat. This contrasts with the case of Illinois, where 
Brown and Weisbenner (2014) reported that the proportion of individuals selecting the default 
grew over time. 
To elucidate some of the demographic and other factors associated with workers’ tendency 
to make an active choice of retirement plan options rather default into a plan, Table 2 presents 
some descriptive statistics for new hires between January 1, 2006 and September 30, 2013. The 
table first reports characteristics of all sample individuals, and then it highlights a number of 
subgroups including pre-reform workers, post-reform workers, workers who made an active 
choice, workers who made a passive choice, and all workers who chose each plan option. For each 
of these subgroups, we report classifications by employer type and pension system. The largest 
group, making up almost half of the full sample, is public school employees. Higher education 
staffers comprise 11% of the sample; university faculty are not included in this system. Local 
governmental employees account for almost a quarter of the sample, and state employees 
constitute 18% of the sample. The majority of the sample is covered by the Public Employees’ 
Retirement System, and an additional 7% are members of the more generous Public Safety and 
15 
 
 
 
Firefighters’ System.   Most new hires are women (62%), and the average salary earned in the 
second calendar year of employment (the “plan choice year”) was around $32,000 in 2014 dollars. 
The average entry age across all workers in our sample is 33.3, although individuals hired after the 
reform were slightly younger than those hired before the reform. 
Table 2 here 
Termination rates during the second year of employment were around 13%. In the sample, 
the termination rates appear to be the same for the pre-reform and post-reform groups; however, 
the post-reform group includes almost a full year of new hires still in their second year on the job 
when the sample was drawn.  Accordingly the termination rate for the post-reform group may be 
understated: if we remove these recent hires from the sample, we find that the post-reform 
termination rate is about 17%. Almost 35% of pre-reform new hires made voluntary contributions 
to one of the supplemental retirement plans offered by URS during the plan choice year, but only 
18% of the post-reform sample contributed to these plans. 
Table 3 categorizes workers by individual and job characteristics, and it also shows the 
percentage of new hires in each subgroup who elected each plan option. A higher proportion of 
men made an active choice. Women were more likely to opt for the DC plan, among those making 
an active plan choice. Employees with higher initial salaries also were more likely to make an 
active choice; moreover, more highly-compensated employees who made an active choice tended 
to favor the DC plan. Employees working at educational institutions were more likely to default 
into the hybrid, and general government employees were more likely to make an active choice. 
Educational employees who made an active choice were more likely to choose the DC plan, while 
general government employees who made an active choice were more likely to choose the hybrid 
plan.  In summary, defaulters differed from the active choosers in a number of ways. On average, 
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defaulters were two years younger, made $6,000 less per year, were much less likely to be 
employed in state government, and were more likely to be in public education. 
Table 3 here 
We explore these patterns further using multivariate regression analysis, with results 
appearing in Table 4. Six linear probability models are presented, 22 with two specifications for 
each of three dependent variables: (i) enrolled in hybrid plan whether by default or active choice, 
(ii) made an active choice, and (iii) chose the DC given that an active choice was made.  The first 
specification for each dependent variable includes a vector of individual and job characteristics, 
while the second specification also controls on two actions taken after the plan choice:  whether 
the new hire terminated employment, and whether the new hire contributed to a supplemental 
retirement savings plan.   
Table 4 here 
The first column presents results for models of whether new hires enrolled in the hybrid 
plan, either by default or by active choice.  In a sense, this analysis assumes that defaulters elected 
inaction, knowing they would end up in their desired plan. State government employees (the 
reference category in the equation) were 5-8 percentage points less likely to participate in the 
hybrid than were local government, public education, or higher education employees.  Members 
of the Public Safety & Firefighters’ system were more likely to enroll in the hybrid, as were men 
and the lower-paid.   
Column 3 of Table 4 reports on which newly hired employees made an active election of 
their retirement plan; the model posits that defaulters differ from participants who made an active 
choice.  Results indicate that new hires age 45+ over were more likely, and those younger than 25 
                                                        
22 Appendix Table 3 presents similar results from a series of Probit models.  The marginal effects in the two procedures 
are similar in sign and magnitude. 
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less likely, to make an active choice compared to those age 25-29.  Men tended not to make an 
active selection, while state government employees were significantly more active compared to 
those in higher education, local government, or public education.  Interestingly, in each succeeding 
year, new hires were increasingly likely to make an active election, perhaps reflecting growing 
knowledge about the two plans and their differences.  
In Column 5 of Table 4, we describe which persons making an active selection chose the 
DC plan.  Among these employees, older persons were more likely to select the hybrid plan, 
perhaps because they expected to be less likely to change jobs in the future. Conditional on making 
an active choice, men chose the hybrid plan more often, while the higher paid elected the DC plan. 
Higher education staffers were 9 percentage points less likely to elect the hybrid plan, perhaps 
indicating their greater anticipated career mobility. Over time, a larger percentage of new hires 
who made an active choice selected the hybrid plan. 
Two additional variables are included in Columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 4, in an effort to 
control for factors indicative of additional difficult-to-observe information about new hires. That 
is, we determined whether each participant subsequently contributed to a URS supplemental 
retirement plan, and whether each terminated his employment in the second year on the job.  
Interestingly, participants who did save in the supplemental plans were also more likely to have 
made an active pension choice in their first year. In other words, these individuals appear to have 
been more attentive than average to retirement plan features. By contrast, workers leaving 
employment in their second year were less likely to have made an active plan choice, and when 
they did, they chose the DC plan more often.  In other words, the defaulters are also more likely 
to anticipate that they will leave public employment. 
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Did the Reform Boost Supplemental Retirement Saving?  
If new hires understand that the post-reform retirement plans are likely to be less generous 
than the old DB plan, they may make an effort to save more in the supplemental retirement plans 
to accumulate sufficient retirement resources.23  To test for this, we have calculated participation 
patterns in supplemental retirement plan for pre- and post-reform new hires. These are based on 
employee contributions to URS supplemental plans and do not include employer contributions to 
the 401(k) plan associated with the hybrid or DC plan.   
Figure 2 and Table 5 reveal the time path of supplemental plan participation over the 
period. Of note is the long-term decline in supplemental plan participation throughout the period, 
most likely attributable to the recession and collapse of the equity markets. Prior to the reform, the 
proportion of new hires enrolling in supplemental plans fell from over 40 percent (2006-08) to 
only about 25 percent for those hired from 2009-11.  Post-reform, the proportion of new hires 
contributing to a supplemental plan continued to fall, to below 20 percent. Figure 2 also shows that 
employees who defaulted into the hybrid plan post-reform were far less likely to contribute to 
supplemental accounts, compared to new hires making an active plan choice. Participation rates 
for those making an active election were actually higher than pre-reform (33 verses about 25 
percent) while those who defaulted into the hybrid plan were much less likely to save additional 
amounts (7 percent).  Finally, those who elected the hybrid plan were somewhat more likely to 
enroll in one of the supplemental saving plans, compared to those choosing the DC. 
Figure 2 and Table 5 here 
                                                        
23 Indeed the NASRA (2014c) report states that “public employees will need to take advantage of supplemental savings 
vehicles to maintain similar salary replacement rates in retirement, pre and post reform” (p.14). 
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A multivariate linear probability analysis of the time pattern in Table 6 shows that some, 
but not all, new hires with the less generous Tier II pensions responded by increasing their 
retirement saving.24  As one might expect, new hires with higher annual salary were more likely 
to be contributing to the supplemental plan, as were older employees.25  However, age is not 
significant for state employees. But our key finding is that participants making an active election 
of primary plan were about 22 percentage points more likely to participate in a supplemental plan, 
holding other factors constant (Column 1).  Since we only have data on contributions to URS 
Savings Plans, and some individuals could be participating in other plans offered by their 
employer,26 we also break out state employees only for whom we observe all participation in 
employer-provided supplemental retirement plans. Results in Column 2 show even greater 
differences: those actively choosing their primary plan were 40 percentage points more likely to 
make supplementary contributions, versus those defaulted into the hybrid plan.   
Table 6 here 
 
How the Reform Affected Turnover Patterns   
One concern sometimes expressed by employers who alter their retirement plans is whether 
such changes will influence turnover rates.27  Because our dataset includes terminations reported 
prior to November 1, 2014, and there is a 30-60 day lag in employer reporting, we restrict our 
                                                        
24 Appendix Table 3 presents similar results from a series of Probit models.  The marginal effects in the two procedures 
are similar in sign and magnitude. 
25 Beshears, Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2009) have showed that the low paid were more susceptible to the influence 
of defaults due to barriers to active decision-making. 
26 Public universities, community colleges, and many school districts offer their own 457 and 403(b) plans and some 
local governments offer 457 plans. 
27 In fact, this research project began with a conversation with Richard Ellis, Treasurer of the State of Utah in which 
he indicated his concern that turnover rates had risen since the implementation of the pension reforms. 
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sample for this analysis to individuals hired prior to September 30, 2012.  Additionally, we remove 
43 individuals who terminated employment due to death or disability.  
Figure 3 reports the proportion of pre- and post-reform new hires who remained employed 
for at least two years. Since our sample includes only individuals who remained employed for at 
least one year, this proportion represents the second-year retention rate conditional on remaining 
employed at least one year. Our pre-reform series begins with new hires during the final six months 
of fiscal year 2006, extends through the recession years, and ends with fiscal year 2011. The post-
reform data includes employees hired during fiscal year 2012 and the first three months of fiscal 
year 2013.  
Figure 3 here 
Our tabulations in Table 7 indicate that more than 87% of those hired prior to the reform 
were still employed two years later, while fewer than 83% of those hired after the reform remained 
as of the two-year mark. It is also interesting that new hires not making an active choice of a 
pension plan post-reform had considerably higher turnover rates, as compared to new hires who 
elected either the DC or the hybrid plan. People who chose the DC plan had slightly higher turnover 
rates, compared to those in the hybrid plan. 
Table 7 here 
In Table 8, we report estimated coefficients of the probability of an employee remaining 
on the job after one year of employment. Three groups are of interest: post-reform hires, the full 
sample, and the sample of DB and hybrid participants alone.28  Once again, it is clear that people 
who defaulted into the hybrid plan behave differently, compared to those making an active choice. 
Employees who actively elected the hybrid plan were eight percentage points more likely to remain 
                                                        
28 Appendix Table 5 presents similar results from a series of Probit models.  The marginal effects in the two procedures 
are similar in sign and magnitude. 
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on the job compared to the defaulters, and new hires electing the DC plan were two percentage 
points more likely to remain on the job versus the defaulters.  Moreover, turnover post-reform was 
about four percentage points higher than in pre-reform years, and the results are largely similar for 
the samples with or without DC participants. Older employees were less likely to leave public 
employment, as were men and those with higher annual salaries.   
Table 8 here 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
State and local governmental pension managers across the United States confront important 
financial challenges due to low pension funding ratios and rapidly rising contributions required to 
maintain these plans. In response to this financial challenge, many public sector employers have 
modified their retirement plans to reduce both their current annual pension costs and future pension 
liabilities. A few states have implemented more systematic changes, freezing their traditional DB 
plans and instead, offering employees a choice of alternatives that shift investment risk away from 
employers and onto employees. Utah is a prime example of a state that has fundamentally altered 
its retirement plan for newly hired workers, by replacing its traditional DB plan with the choice of 
a hybrid plan or a DC. Our analysis contributes to the relatively limited literature by examining 
the impact of public retirement plan reform on Utah’s public sector workforce.  
Similar to other studies, we find that a majority (about 60 percent) of the URS new hires 
defaulted into the hybrid plan. Among those who did make an active choice, slightly more than 
half selected the hybrid plan, and the remainder chose the DC plan. Our analysis goes further in 
evaluating the impact of public pension reform by examining employee behavior post-reform. 
Since the new plan options are anticipated to yield less generous benefits than the old DB plan, we 
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evaluate whether new hires saved more, compared to pre-reform employees, and whether the new 
plan led to higher turnover rates. Our analysis of participation in supplemental saving plans spans 
the Great Recession, so it is difficult to draw unambiguous conclusions. Nevertheless, we find that, 
post-reform, fewer new hires enrolled in supplemental retirement plans compared to pre-reform, 
so they did not respond to lower expected retirement incomes by increasing their retirement saving. 
Interestingly, however, new hires who did make an active plan choice were also more likely to 
enroll in the supplemental plan than pre-reform new hires: 33 percent of individuals making an 
active choice enrolled in a supplemental plan during the post-reform period, compared to around 
25 percent in the three years before the reform was enacted. By contrast, those defaulting into the 
hybrid plan had lower enrollment rates in supplemental plans. In other words, this analysis 
suggests that people who are defaulters in one dimension – failing to make a choice of their primary 
plan – also fail to make an active choice in other areas, like enrolling in a supplemental plan. 
We also evaluated whether the less generous retirement system is associated with higher 
termination rates among new hires, and here we found that 4 percent more new hires left public 
employment in Utah post-reform, compared to beforehand. We must caveat this conclusion by 
noting that post-reform turnover could also reflect a recovering labor market compared to the years 
prior to the plan change. In other words, if job opportunities improved post reform, newly-hired 
public employees may have had other employment options to consider. 
It is also likely that many workers’ failure to make active retirement plan choices could 
spur plan administrators to provide financial education programs and opportunities to learn about 
the retirement benefits offered. This could enhance their old age provision, and might also reduce 
turnover among new hires. As yet we cannot determine how these reforms may influence public 
employees’ retirement patterns, nor do we estimate cost savings to the state or taxpayers associated 
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with the reform in this paper. But we do believe that defaults in pension reforms shape public 
workers’ employment, saving, and turnover behaviors. Consequently, public sector pension 
managers and policymakers may wish to consider these effects when evaluating future pension 
reforms. 
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Table 1.  Plan Choice by Newly-Hired Utah Public Employees  
 Plan Choice  
Entry Date 
Chose DC Chose Hybrid Defaulted into Hybrid Defaulted into DB 
N 
Fiscal Year Ending      
June 30, 2006 . . . 100.0 2,709 
 2007 . . . 100.0 8,546 
 2008 . . . 100.0 8,927 
 2009 . . . 100.0 6,898 
 2010 . . . 100.0 5,326 
 2011 . . . 100.0 5,814 
 2012 20.4 19.0 60.6 . 6,333 
 2013 19.4 23.5 57.1 . 6,698 
 2014 21.1 24.9 54.0 . 3,064 
Pre-Reform . . . 100.0 38,220 
Post-Reform 20.1 22.0 57.9 . 16,095 
All 6.0 6.5 17.2 70.4 54,315 
 
Note: The table indicates the percentage of new hires who choose or were defaulted into each plan.  Employees who 
first entered employment with a Utah Retirement Systems-covered employer between January 1, 2006 and September 
30, 2013 and did not terminate employment during the first 12 months are included. The pre-reform group includes 
individuals hired before July 1, 2011 who were automatically enrolled in a traditional defined benefit (DB) plan.  The 
post-reform group includes individuals hired on or after July 1, 2011 who were given the choice between a defined 
contribution (DC) plan and a hybrid plan.  Plan choice elections become final at the end of the first year of 
employment.  Individuals in the post-reform group who did not make an active election during the first year were 
defaulted into the hybrid plan.  The fiscal year ending June 30, 2006 includes only individuals hired during the six-
month period beginning January 1, 2006.  The fiscal year ending June 30, 2014 includes only individuals hired during 
the three-month period ending September 30, 2013. 
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Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics for Analysis Sample 
 
 
Full 
Sample 
All Pre-
Reform 
All Post- 
Reform 
Made 
Active 
Choice 
Chose 
DC 
Chose 
Hybrid 
Defaulted 
into 
Hybrid 
All 
Hybrid 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Employer         
Higher Education 11.0% 11.0% 10.9% 9.2% 10.9% 7.5% 12.1% 10.9% 
Local Government 24.5% 26.0% 20.8% 23.4% 20.0% 26.5% 19.0% 21.0% 
Public Education 47.0% 45.1% 51.5% 44.2% 46.1% 42.5% 56.7% 52.8% 
State Government 17.5% 17.8% 16.8% 23.3% 23.0% 23.5% 12.2% 15.3% 
System         
Public Employees 93.5% 92.9% 94.8% 93.6% 95.7% 91.7% 95.7% 94.5% 
Public Safety & 
Firefighters 
6.5% 7.1% 5.2% 6.4% 4.3% 8.3% 4.3% 5.4% 
Demographics         
Entry age 33.3 33.4 33.1 34.3 33.3 35.2 32.3 33.1 
Salary in plan choice year $32,334 $32,595 $31,712 $35,735 $36,708 $34,843 $28,789 $30,456 
Male 38.3% 38.6% 37.4% 40.2% 36.4% 43.8% 35.4% 37.7% 
Actions after choice         
Terminated in second 
year^ 
13.1% 13.0% 13.3% 9.3% 12.2% 6.8% 16.3% 13.6% 
Contributed to SRP in 
 plan choice year# 
29.7% 34.5% 18.2% 33.9% 32.3% 35.5% 6.8% 14.7% 
Entry Year         
2006 4.99% 7.09% . . . . . . 
2007 15.73% 22.36% . . . . . . 
2008 16.44% 23.36% . . . . . . 
2009 12.70% 18.05% . . . . . . 
2010 9.81% 13.94% . . . . . . 
2011 10.70% 15.21% . . . . . . 
2012 11.66% . 39.35% 36.82% 39.89% 34.01% 41.19% 39.21% 
2013 12.33% . 41.62% 42.39% 40.17% 44.44% 41.05% 41.98% 
2014 5.64% . 19.04% 20.79% 19.94% 21.55% 17.77% 18.81% 
Plan Choice Year         
2007 15.2% 21.6% . . . . . . 
2008 16.2% 23.0% . . . . . . 
2009 15.7% 22.3% . . . . . . 
2010 9.4% 13.3% . . . . . . 
2011 10.0% 14.3% . . . . . . 
2012 11.3% 5.5% 25.3% 21.8% 24.0% 19.8% 27.8% 25.6% 
2013 12.4% . 41.6% 41.4% 41.6% 41.2% 41.7% 41.6% 
2014 9.8% . 33.2% 36.8% 34.5% 39.0% 30.6% 32.9% 
         
N 54,315 38,220 16,095 6,773 3,233 3,540 9,321 12,861 
 
Note:  This table includes employees who first entered employment with a URS covered employer between January 
1, 2006 and September 30, 2013 and did not terminate employment during the first 12 months.  Individuals with 
missing information are excluded.   
^Only reflects termination dates reported before November 1, 2014, and therefore understates the percentage of post-
reform new hires who have terminated and therefore understates the percentage of post-reform new hires  
#SRP=Supplemental Retirement Plan (e.g. 401(k), 457) 
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Table 3. Plan Choice by Group 
  Chose DC Chose Hybrid Defaulted into Hybrid 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Employer    
Higher Education 20.2 15.3 64.6 
Local Government 19.3 28.0 52.7 
Public Education 18.0 18.2 63.9 
State Government 27.4 30.7 41.9 
System    
Public Employees 20.3 21.3 58.4 
Public Safety & Firefighters 16.5 35.3 48.2 
Entry age     
Under 25 18.4 15.2 66.4 
25 - 29 21.9 21.6 56.5 
30 - 34 21.1 24.7 54.2 
35 - 39 20.6 22.8 56.6 
40 - 44 18.2 24.7 57.1 
45 and Above 20.0 28.6 51.4 
Sex    
Female 20.4 19.8 59.8 
Male 19.5 25.7 54.7 
Salary in plan choice year    
Under $10,000 9.0 8.0 82.9 
$10,000 - $19,999 13.1 12.3 74.6 
$20,000 - $29,999 21.4 15.3 63.3 
$30,000- $39,999 24.3 22.8 52.9 
$40,000 - $49,999. 27.1 26.0 47.0 
$50,000 and Above 29.3 35.6 35.1 
Employment status year after plan choice year^    
Terminated 18.3 11.1 70.6 
Active 20.4 23.7 56.0 
SRP participation in plan choice year#    
Not Contributing 16.7 17.4 66.0 
Contributing 35.5 42.8 21.7 
    
Observations  3,233   3,540   9,321  
 
Note: The table provides the percentage of new hires with a given characteristic who made plan choices given in the 
column headings. It includes employees who first entered employment with a URS-covered employer between 
January 1, 2006 and September 30, 2013 and did not terminate employment during the first 12 months.  Individuals 
with missing information are excluded. 
^Reflects termination dates reported before November 1, 2014, and therefore understates the percentage of post-reform 
new hires who have terminated. 
#SRP=Supplemental Retirement Plan (e.g. 401(k), 457) 
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Table 4. Multivariate (OLS) Estimates of Plan Choice 
  Dependent Variable 
 
Hybrid  
(by default or choice) 
Any Active Choice 
Choose DC  
(given active choice) 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
           
Entry Age: Under 25 0.017* 0.016* -0.056*** -0.051*** 0.032* 0.029 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018) 
Entry Age: 25 – 29 (reference)       
       
Entry Age: 30 - 34 0.014 0.016 0.010 0.005 -0.043** -0.043** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.020) (0.019) 
Entry Age: 35 - 39 0.016 0.017 0.004 0.001 -0.043** -0.041* 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.022) (0.022) 
Entry Age: 40 - 44 0.035*** 0.042*** 0.012 -0.007 -0.100*** -0.094*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.024) 
Entry Age: 45 and Above 0.015 0.023** 0.071*** 0.048*** -0.111*** -0.108*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.018) 
Male 0.044*** 0.042*** -0.032*** -0.029*** -0.070*** -0.070*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.014) 
Salary in plan choice year (in $10,000) -0.046*** -0.042*** 0.065*** 0.054*** 0.030*** 0.032*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Employer: State Government (reference)       
       
Employer: Higher Education 0.045*** -0.004 -0.165*** -0.055*** 0.096*** 0.089*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.024) (0.024) 
Employer: Local Government 0.071*** 0.060*** -0.105*** -0.085*** -0.046*** -0.043** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.018) 
Employer: Public Education 0.068*** 0.018* -0.154*** -0.045*** 0.007 0.010 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.017) 
System:  Public Employees (reference)       
       
System:  Public Safety & Firefighters  0.049*** 0.054*** 0.036* 0.018 -0.116*** -0.105*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.018) (0.026) (0.026) 
Plan Choice Year: 2012 (reference)       
       
Plan Choice Year: 2013 -0.001 -0.002 0.034*** 0.035*** -0.044*** -0.047*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.016) (0.016) 
Plan Choice Year: 2014 -0.004 0.000 0.071*** 0.053*** -0.075*** -0.065*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016) 
Terminated in year after plan choice  -0.006  -0.075***  0.141*** 
  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.021) 
Contributed to SRP in plan choice year  -0.175***  0.389***  -0.012 
  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.014) 
Constant 0.859*** 0.909*** 0.305*** 0.219*** 0.486*** 0.463*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017) (0.027) (0.028) 
       
N 16,095 16,095 16,095 16,095 6,773 6,773 
R-squared 0.036 0.060 0.077 0.161 0.035 0.042 
Mean 0.799 0.799 0.421 0.421 0.477 0.477 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Table 5. Supplemental Retirement Plan Participation in Calendar Year after Year of Hire 
 All Hired Post-Reform Made Active Choice  
Entry Date 
All Pre-
Reform 
All Post-
Reform 
Made Active 
Choice 
Defaulted 
into Hybrid 
Chose 
Hybrid 
Chose 
DC Observations 
Fiscal Year Ending        
June 30,  2006 46.8 . . . . . 2,709  
 2007 44.0 . . . . . 8,546  
 2008 39.7 . . . . . 8,927  
 2009 25.7 . . . . . 6,898  
 2010 24.1 . . . . . 5,326  
 2011 26.7 . . . . . 5,814  
 2012 . 17.8 34.0 7.3 33.6 34.4 6,333  
 2013 . 19.7 36.3 7.2 38.3 33.8 6,698  
 2014 . 15.9 29.0 4.8 32.6 24.8 3,064  
All 34.5 18.2 33.9 6.8 35.5 32.3 54,315  
 
Note: The table shows the percentage of employees in each group who contributed to one of the Utah Retirement 
Systems (URS) supplemental retirement savings plans in the calendar year following the year of hire.  For example, 
an individual who was first hired February 1, 2012 is counted as a supplemental plan participant if he or she contributed 
during calendar year 2013. Employees who first entered employment with a URS covered employer between January 
1, 2006 and September 30, 2013 and did not terminate employment during the first 12 months are included. The pre-
reform group includes individuals hired before July 1, 2011 who were automatically enrolled in a traditional defined 
benefit plan.  The post-reform group includes individuals hired on or after July 1, 2011 who were given the choice 
between a defined contribution (DC) plan and a hybrid plan.  Plan choice elections become final at the end of the first 
year of employment.  Individuals in the post-reform group who did not make an active election during the first year 
were defaulted into the hybrid plan.  The fiscal year ending June 30, 2006 only includes individuals hired during the 
six-month period beginning January 1, 2006.  The fiscal year ending June 30, 2014 only includes individuals hired 
during the three-month period ending September 30, 2013. 
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Table 6. Multivariate (OLS) Estimates of Participation in Supplemental Retirement Plans 
(SRPs) 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Contributed to SRP during plan choice year 
 
 
All Post-Reform Only State Government 
Independent Variable (1) (2) 
   
Plan Choice: Defaulted into Hybrid (reference)   
   
Plan Choice: Chose DC 0.216*** 0.457*** 
 (0.008) (0.021) 
Plan Choice: Chose Hybrid 0.232*** 0.419*** 
 (0.008) (0.020) 
Entry Age: Under 25 0.004 -0.038 
 (0.007) (0.023) 
Entry Age:  25 – 29 (reference)   
   
Entry Age: 30 - 34 0.009 -0.031 
 (0.010) (0.025) 
Entry Age: 35 - 39 0.003 -0.036 
 (0.010) (0.030) 
Entry Age: 40 - 44 0.036*** 0.041 
 (0.011) (0.035) 
Entry Age: 45 and Above 0.033*** 0.038 
 (0.009) (0.027) 
Male -0.004 -0.036** 
 (0.006) (0.017) 
Salary in plan choice year (in $10,000) 0.010*** 0.017*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) 
Employer: State Government (reference)   
   
Employer: Higher Education -0.242***  
 (0.011)  
Employer: Local Government -0.036***  
 (0.012)  
Employer: Public Education -0.252***  
 (0.009)  
System:  Public Employees (reference)   
   
System: Public Safety & Firefighters 0.022 0.013 
 (0.017) (0.029) 
Plan Choice Year:  2012 (reference)   
   
Plan Choice Year: 2013 -0.009 0.078*** 
 (0.007) (0.022) 
Plan Choice Year: 2014 0.011 0.188*** 
 (0.007) (0.023) 
Constant 0.207*** -0.008 
 (0.014) (0.029) 
   
N 16,095 2,711 
R-squared 0.213 0.250 
Mean 0.182 0.388 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 7.  Second Year Retention Rates 
 All Hired Post-Reform Made Active Choice  
Entry Date 
All Pre-
Reform 
All Post-
Reform 
Made Active 
Choice 
Defaulted 
into Hybrid 
Chose 
Hybrid 
Chose 
DC N 
Fiscal Year Ending        
June 30,  2006 86.9 . . . . . 2,708 
 2007 87.0 . . . . . 8,537 
 2008 87.9 . . . . . 8,913 
 2009 86.7 . . . . . 6,890 
 2010 86.2 . . . . . 5,323 
 2011 87.1 . . . . . 5,807 
 2012 . 83.5 88.3 80.3 91.1 85.7 6,333 
 2013 . 81.4 85.8 78.6 90.7 80.8 3,388 
All 87.1 82.8 87.5 79.7 91.0 84.1 47,899 
 
Note: The table shows the percentage of employees in each group who remained employed by Utah Retirement System 
covered employer for at least two years. Employees who first entered employment with a Utah Retirement System 
covered employer between January 1, 2006 and September 30, 2012 and did not terminate employment during the 
first 12 months are included.  Therefore, this table reflects retention rates during the second year of employment, given 
that an individual remained employed through the first year.  For example, an individual hired February 1, 2012 is not 
included in the table unless he or she remained employed through February 1, 2013, and is not counted as remaining 
for at least two years if he or she terminated employment prior to February 1, 2014.  Individuals who terminated 
employment due to death or disability are not included (n=43). 
 
The pre-reform group includes individuals hired before July 1, 2011 who were automatically enrolled in a traditional 
defined benefit plan.  The post-reform group includes individuals hired on or after July 1, 2011 who were given the 
choice between a defined contribution (DC) plan and a hybrid plan.  Plan choice elections become final at the end of 
the first year of employment.  Individuals in the post-reform group who did not make an active election during the 
first year were defaulted into the hybrid plan.  The fiscal year ending June 30, 2006 only includes individuals hired 
during the six-month period beginning January 1, 2006.  The fiscal year ending June 30, 2013 only includes individuals 
hired during the three-month period ending September 30, 2012. 
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Table 8. Multivariate (OLS) Estimates of Retention in Second Year 
 Dependent Variable: Remain in second year 
 Post-Reform All All DB and Hybrid 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
    
Plan Choice:  Defaulted into Hybrid (reference)    
    
Plan Choice: Chose DC 0.023**   
 (0.010)   
Plan Choice: Chose Hybrid 0.081***   
 (0.009)   
Post-Reform  -0.037*** -0.038*** 
  (0.004) (0.005) 
Entry Age: Under 25 -0.035*** -0.031*** -0.030*** 
 (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) 
Entry Age: 25 – 29 (reference)    
    
Entry Age: 30 - 34 -0.004 0.018*** 0.019*** 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) 
Entry Age: 35 - 39 0.025* 0.041*** 0.042*** 
 (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) 
Entry Age: 40 - 44 0.039*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 
 (0.014) (0.006) (0.006) 
Entry Age: 45 and Above 0.042*** 0.053*** 0.055*** 
 (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) 
Male 0.016* 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) 
Salary in plan choice year (in $10,000) 0.032*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Employer:  State Government (reference)    
    
Employer: Higher Education 0.001 -0.037*** -0.041*** 
 (0.017) (0.007) (0.007) 
Employer: Local Government 0.061*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) 
Employer: Public Education 0.051*** 0.025*** 0.022*** 
 (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) 
System: Public Employees (reference)     
    
System: Public Safety & Firefighters 0.109*** 0.087*** 0.085*** 
 (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) 
Plan Choice Year: 2012 (reference)    
    
Plan Choice Year: 2013 -0.027***   
 (0.008)   
Plan Choice Year: 2014 -0.186***   
 (0.072)   
Constant 0.672*** 0.762*** 0.765*** 
 (0.019) (0.007) (0.007) 
    
N 9,721 47,899 45,952 
R-squared 0.045 0.031 0.032 
Mean 0.828 0.862 0.863 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Figure 1. Changes Wrought by Utah’s Public Pension Reform 
 
Choice of Default Plan 
 60 percent of new hires failed to make an active choice of 
their retirement plan 
 Young employees, who may be better served by the DC plan, 
were more likely to default into the hybrid plan. 
Supplemental 
Retirement Savings 
 Despite lower expected benefits from pension, fewer new 
employees contributed to a supplemental saving plan 
 Defaulters were much less likely to contribute to a saving 
plan; participation rate was 30 percentage points lower 
Turnover Rates 
 Employees covered by less generous retirement benefits 
more likely to leave public employment. 
 
Source: See text. 
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Figure 2.  Patterns of Supplemental Retirement Plan Participation 
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Figure 3.  Second-Year Termination Rates 
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Appendix Table 1.  Summary of Benefits by System 
 
 Tier I Tier II 
Description A person entering full-time employments with a 
participating employer before July 1, 2011 is a 
member of the Tier I system.   The Contributory 
System was closed to new employees of the State 
and its Education institutions on July 1, 1986; a 
few Local Governmental employers continue to 
enroll new employees in this system. 
 
A person entering full-time employment with a participating employer 
on or after July 1, 2011 who does not have service credit in a Tier I 
system must make an election to participate in either the Hybrid 
System or the Defined Contribution (DC) Plan, within one year of 
his/her employment date. The election made is irrevocable. If no 
election is made, the employee automatically becomes a member of 
the Hybrid System. 
Retirement 
System 
Public 
Employees 
Contributory 
 
Public 
Employees 
Noncontributory 
Public 
Safety/ 
Firefighters 
Public 
Employees 
(Hybrid) 
Public 
Employees 
(DC) 
Public Safety/ 
Firefighters 
(Hybrid) 
Public Safety/ 
Firefighters 
(DC) 
Qualifications 
(years/age) 
30 yrs any age 
20 yrs age 60¹ 
10 yrs age 62¹ 
4 yrs age 65 
30 yrs any age 
25 yrs any age1 
20 yrs age 601 
10 yrs age 621 
4 yrs age 65 
20 yrs any age 
10 yrs age 60 
4 yrs age 65 
35 yrs any age 
20 yrs age 60
1
 
10 yrs age 62
1
 
4 yrs age 65 
Members will 
have access to 
the full value of 
their vested 
account balance 
when they leave 
employment. 
25 yrs any age 
20 yrs age 60
1
 
10 yrs age 62
1
 
4 yrs age 65 
Members will 
have access to the 
full value of their 
vested account 
balance when 
they leave 
e mployment. 
Formula 1.25 per yr to 
6/30/1975 
2 per yr 
7/1/1975 to 
present 
2 per yr all years 2.5 per yr up 
to 20 yrs  
2 per yr over 
20 yrs 
1.5  per year of 
service credit. 
401(k) 
contribution 
(Equal to 10 
minus the 
Hybrid DB Plan 
Rate) 
Employer 
contributes 10 to 
member 401(k) 
plan. 
 
Benefit is not 
based on a fixed 
formula. 
1.5  per year of 
service credit. 
401(k) 
contribution 
(Equal to 12 
minus the 
Hybrid DB 
Plan Rate) 
Employer 
contributes 12 to 
member 401(k) 
plan. 
 
Benefit is not 
based on a fixed 
formula. 
Final Average 
Salary 
Highest 5 yrs Highest 3 yrs Highest 3 yrs Highest 5 yrs Not applicable Highest 5 yrs Not applicable 
Cost-of-Living 
(max) 
4
2
 4 
2
 Public Safety: 
2.5
2
 
Firefighters: 
4
2
 
2.5
2
 None 2.5
2
 None 
1 Early retirement benefit calculated with actuarial reduction. 
2 Eligible after one year; percentage increase based on original benefit and change in CPI. Effective July 1, 2008, Tier I Public safety 
employers have the option to raise COLA from 2.5 to 4. 
 
Adapted from Employer’s Guide to the Utah Retirement Systems https://www.urs.org/mango/pdf/urs/Miscellaneous/employerGuide.pdf 
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Appendix Table 2.  Data Construction and Variable Description 
 
All 
Pre-
reform 
Post-reform 
All All 
Post-
Reform 
Hybrid 
default 
Hybrid 
elect 
DC Pending 
(1) Individuals in original file 53,725 29,358 13,249 3,959 3,772 8,378 83,083 
(2) With some non-missing annual data 48,439 28,324 12,929 3,948 3,616 7,831 76,763 
(3) Entered URS between January 1, 
2006 and September 30, 2013 
48,389 20,107 12,652 3,840 3,603 12 68,496 
(4) No service in Judicial or Legislative 48,353 20,106 12,652 3,840 3,602 12 68,459 
(5) No previous employment with URS  47,924 20,072 12,633 3,837 3,591 11 67,996 
(6) Did not terminate during the first 12 
months of employment (the “plan 
choice year”) 
39,154 16,263 9,448 3,553 3,262 0 55,417 
(7) Annualized salary available in year of 
plan choice or year following plan 
choice. 
38,321 16,095 9,321 3,540 3,234 0 54,321 
(8) Age and gender available 38,220 16,095 9,321 3,540 3,234  54,315 
(9) Entered URS between January 1, 
2006 and September 30, 2012 
38,220 9,721 5,893 1,881 1,947 0 47,942 
(10) Remove terminations due to death or 
disability 
38,136 9,720 5,893 1,881 1,947 0 47,899 
We use the dataset in row 8 for all analysis except the analysis of retention rates (Tables 7 and 8) for which we use 
the data set in row 10. 
 
Variable Definitions 
Entry Year:  The fiscal year ending June 30 during which the individual was first hired into a eligible 
position by a Utah Retirement System covered employer 
Plan Choice Year:  The first calendar year after the entry year in which the individual earned at least 
.0417 years of service credit.  For individuals hired after July 1, 2011, this is the calendar year 
that includes the date when their plan choice became final, or the year immediately following that 
year, if they first hired near the end of the year.  
Entry age:  Approximate age of employee when they first became a member of one of the plans 
administered by the Utah Retirement System. 
Salary in plan choice year:  Employee earning in the plan choice year in 2014 dollars.  If less than one 
year of service was reported, earnings are annualized by dividing total salary by total reported 
service. 
Employer:  The classification of the employer where the individual worked most during the calendar year 
in which plan choice became final. State Government includes quasi-state agencies and 
independent agencies. 
System:  The pension system in which the individual earned the most service credit during the calendar 
year in which plan choice became final. 
Terminated in second  year:  Indicator for an individual separating from employment within the first 24 
months, based on terminations reported before November 1, 2014. 
Contributed to SRP in  plan choice year:  Indicator for an individual making a contribution of any amount 
to at least one of the four Supplemental Retirement Plans (SRPs) offered by URS. 
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Appendix Table 3.  Probit Estimates of Plan Choice:  Marginal Effects 
  Dependent Variable 
 
Hybrid  
(by default or choice) 
Any Active Choice 
Choose DC  
(given active choice) 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
           
Entry Age: Under 25 0.020** 0.019** -0.055*** -0.050*** 0.032* 0.028 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018) 
Entry Age: 25 – 29 (reference)       
       
Entry Age: 30 – 34 0.016 0.017* 0.009 0.004 -0.043** -0.043** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.020) (0.019) 
Entry Age: 35 – 39 0.019* 0.020* 0.004 0.001 -0.043* -0.041* 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.022) (0.022) 
Entry Age: 40 – 44 0.038*** 0.045*** 0.013 -0.004 -0.099*** -0.093*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.024) 
Entry Age: 45 and Above 0.019* 0.027*** 0.075*** 0.053*** -0.110*** -0.106*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.018) 
Male 0.044*** 0.042*** -0.034*** -0.030*** -0.070*** -0.069*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.013) 
Salary in plan choice year (in $10,000) -0.042*** -0.038*** 0.069*** 0.057*** 0.030*** 0.032*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Employer: State Government 
(reference)       
       
Employer: Higher Education 0.041*** -0.011 -0.163*** -0.058*** 0.095*** 0.088*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.024) 
Employer: Local Government 0.067*** 0.050*** -0.105*** -0.092*** -0.046*** -0.043** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.018) 
Employer: Public Education 0.068*** 0.015 -0.153*** -0.050*** 0.007 0.009 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.017) 
System:  Public Employees (reference)       
       
System:  Public Safety & Firefighters  0.041*** 0.045*** 0.033* 0.015 -0.117*** -0.105*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.017) (0.026) (0.026) 
Plan Choice Year: 2012 (reference)       
       
Plan Choice Year: 2013 -0.002 -0.002 0.034*** 0.035*** -0.044*** -0.047*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.016) (0.016) 
Plan Choice Year: 2014 -0.005 -0.001 0.071*** 0.053*** -0.075*** -0.065*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016) 
Terminated in year after plan choice  -0.003  -0.076***  0.140*** 
  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.021) 
Contributed to SRP in plan choice year  -0.173***  0.395***  -0.011 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.014) 
       
N 16,095 16,095 16,095 16,095 6,773 6,773 
Log likelihood -7802.185 -7622.292 -10301.082 -9575.818 -4566.354 -4543.456 
Pseudo R-squared 0.034 0.056 0.060 0.126 0.026 0.031 
Mean 0.799 0.799 0.421 0.421 0.477 0.477 
Standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Appendix Table 4.  Probit  Estimates of Supplemental Retirement Plan (SRP) 
Participation:  Marginal Effects 
 Dependent Variable: 
Contributed to SRP during plan choice year  All Post-Ref rm Only St te G v rnment 
Independent Variable (1) (2) 
   
Plan Choice:  Defaulted into Hybrid (reference)   
   
Plan Choice: Chose DC 0.217*** 0.459*** 
 (0.008) (0.021) 
Plan Choice: Chose Hybrid 0.225*** 0.421*** 
 (0.008) (0.020) 
Entry Age: Under 25 0.001 -0.043* 
 (0.008) (0.025) 
Entry Age:  25 – 29 (reference)   
   
Entry Age: 30 - 34 0.006 -0.027 
 (0.008) (0.025) 
Entry Age: 35 - 39 -0.001 -0.032 
 (0.009) (0.029) 
Entry Age: 40 - 44 0.033*** 0.043 
 (0.011) (0.034) 
Entry Age: 45 and Above 0.028*** 0.037 
 (0.008) (0.026) 
Male -0.004 -0.038** 
 (0.006) (0.017) 
Salary in plan choice year (in $10,000) 0.009*** 0.016*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) 
Employer: State Government (reference)   
   
Employer: Higher Education -0.224***  
 (0.011)  
Employer: Local Government -0.014  
 (0.011)  
Employer: Public Education -0.233***  
 (0.009)  
System:  Public Employees (reference)   
   
System: Public Safety & Firefighters 0.016 0.016 
 (0.011) (0.030) 
Plan Choice Year:  2012 (reference)   
   
Plan Choice Year: 2013 -0.007 0.080*** 
 (0.007) (0.022) 
Plan Choice Year: 2014 0.009 0.186*** 
 (0.007) (0.023) 
   
N 16,095 2,711 
Log likelihood -5844.107 -1433.822 
Pseudo R-squared 0.235 0.208 
Mean 0.182 0.388 
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Appendix Table 5.  Probit Estimates of Retention in Second Year: Marginal Effects 
  Dependent Variable: Remain in second year 
 Post-Reform All All DB and Hybrid 
Independent Variable (1) (3) (2) 
     
Plan Choice:  Defaulted into Hybrid 
(reference) 
   
    
Plan Choice: Chose DC 0.021**   
 (0.010)   
Plan Choice:  Chose Hybrid 0.084***   
 (0.009)   
Post-Reform  -0.035***  
  (0.004)  
Entry Age: Under 25 -0.029*** -0.027*** -0.026*** 
 (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) 
Entry Age: 25 – 29 (reference)    
    
Entry Age: 30 - 34 -0.004 0.019*** 0.021*** 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.006) 
Entry Age: 35 - 39 0.026* 0.043*** 0.044*** 
 (0.014) (0.006) (0.006) 
Entry Age: 40 - 44 0.042*** 0.059*** 0.060*** 
 (0.014) (0.006) (0.006) 
Entry Age: 45 and Above 0.045*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 
 (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) 
Male 0.017** 0.017*** 0.018*** 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) 
Salary in plan choice year (in $10,000) 0.037*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Employer:  State Government (reference)    
    
Employer: Higher Education 0.008 -0.030*** -0.033*** 
 (0.017) (0.007) (0.007) 
Employer: Local Government 0.069*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 
 (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) 
Employer: Public Education 0.057*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) 
System: Public Employees (reference) 
(((reference) 
   
    
System: Public Safety & Firefighters 0.128*** 0.093*** 0.092*** 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) 
Plan Choice Year: 2012 (reference)    
    
Plan Choice Year: 2013 -0.027***   
 (0.008)   
Plan Choice Year: 2014 -0.169***   
 (0.064)   
    
Observations 9,721 47,899 45,952 
Log likelihood -4220.202 -18429.189 -17598.614 
Pseudo R-squared 0.055 0.042 0.043 
Mean 0.828 0.862 0.863 
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
